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Appellant, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization ("Board"), respectfully 
submits the following Brief in Reply pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE BY BAGGETTS 
The procedural posture of this case outlined in the Baggetts' Response 
Brief is not completely accurate. In their summation of the Board's Voluntary 
Motion to Dismiss this appeal filed on November 10, 2003, the Baggetts state that 
" [t]he Board, however fails to indicate that the only condition the Baggetts 
required was that the Board follow Schmidt with respect to their property until it 
has been remediated." Baggett Brief at 5. This statement is false. The Baggetts 
coupled dismissal with conditions to which the Board could not agree. The 
Baggetts requested a zero value for an indefinite period of time until their entire 
property had been remediated. They would have been able to exclude the EPA 
and UDEQ from remediating their property, therefore having a zero value on their 
property in perpetuity. Furthermore, the Baggetts wanted their zero value land 
decision at the Tax Commission level to be applied to all other property owners 
within the designated Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site, whether the other 
property owners had appealed their tax assessment to the Board and had provided 
evidence of contamination of lead and arsenic. The Baggetts also requested costs 
and fees associated with their appeal to which the Board agreed in principle. 
Therefore, the Board could not stipulate to a dismissal under the first prong 
of Utah R. App. P. 37(b). Essentially, the Baggetts held the Board's appeal 
1 
"hostage" with unreasonable conditions, knowing the Board could not agree. 
These excessive requirements, which went beyond the scope of the Baggetts' Tax 
Commission appeal as well as the Board's appeal to this Court, forced the Board 
to file its Voluntary Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the second prong of Rule 
37(b), Utah R. App. P. The Board filed its Voluntary Motion to Dismiss with the 
intention of presenting the issue of the allocation of costs and fees to the Court to 
determine in its sole discretion (once the Court had dismissed the Board's appeal). 
Instead, the Court denied all motions and required and directed the Board to 
prosecute its appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS CASE DIFFERS FROM SCHMIDT. 
The facts in this case differ from those in Schmidt v. Utah State Tax 
Comm yn, County Bd. of Equalization, Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 48, 980 P.2d 
690 (Utah 1999). While the subject property in this case is located within the 
Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site (like the property in Schmidt), the evidence in 
this case indicates that "a willing buyer" would be willing to pay more than zero 
dollars to purchase the land, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12). There is no like 
evidence contained in Schmidt. This case presents a different fact scenario 
requiring a different result and holding. 
The market evidence in Schmidt was much more uncertain than the impact 
of contamination on the market in this case. The facts in this case are not 
"substantially identical," "virtually identical" or even close to the "same" (as 
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Schmidt) as argued by the Baggetts. For instance, in Schmidt, little was known 
about the contamination in the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site when the 
Schmidts purchased and improved their land. In Schmidt it was uncertain 
whether: (1) cleanup costs would be paid by responsible parties or property 
owners; (2) the EPA and/or UDEQ would be involved in any remediation of the 
contaminated Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site; or (3) the EPA and UDEQ 
would continue sampling and testing the soil to gain a better understanding of the 
depth of the contamination and how far the contamination was dispersed. See 
Baggett Brief, Ex. "A" Schmidt v. County Board of Equalization, Final Decision, 
October 7, 1997, ffl[ 8, 11 and 13. The Supreme Court in Schmidt indicated that 
"[n]o agency had required any clean-up or had even done an evaluation of the 
[Schmidt] property." Schmidt at 693. In Schmidt, neither the EPA nor the UDEQ 
had established a remediation plan to restore the contaminated property. 
Conversely, in this case, both the EPA and UDEQ have established remediation 
plans after taking comments from affected property owners for a two-year period. 
Rat 34-35, 216-219, 277.1 
Moreover, unlike the fact of contamination in Schmidt, the contamination 
surrounding the Baggetts' property had been made known to the public 4 years 
prior to the Baggetts' purchase of the subject property and had been made public 
10 years prior to their 2002 tax assessment appeal. R. at 90-91, 235. Both the EPA 
1
 At least four contaminated residential properties in the Flagstaff-Davenport 
Superfund Site have undergone remediation by the EPA and UDEQ at no cost to 
the property owners. 
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and UDEQ have done considerable sampling and testing for contamination of the 
properties located within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site since Schmidt 
was decided. R. at 217. At the time of Schmidt, there hadn't been any sampling 
performed on the property by governmental agencies. Schmidt at 693. In fact, the 
whole 2.7 acres of the Schmidt property had only been sampled in 3 spots. 
Schmidt at 691. The EPA and the UDEQ now know substantially more 
information about the depth of contamination and how far dispersed the 
contamination is in the Superfund Site. The EPA and UDEQ have designated 
specific parameters as the Superfund Site and have selected 20 properties that 
require remediation. R. at 282-290. The EPA and UDEQ have placed the 
Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site on CERCLIS list and on the National 
Priorities List, where it currently is listed within the top 5 nationally. R. at 217. 
The issue of contamination was either known by the Baggetts or should have been 
known by the Baggetts. 
In Schmidt, all of the uncertainty surrounding the contaminated property led 
to the failure of the property owners to obtain conventional financing. The 
Schmidts had been denied financing for their home by several (3) financial 
institutions, due to the fact that the land evidenced levels of lead and arsenic 
contamination. Schmidt at 691. See also Baggett Brief Ex. "A" [^11 and 13 
(wherein Tax Commission findings that the Schmidts were denied financing by 
three lenders and the Board's appraisal did not take into account that a potential 
buyer may be subject to the payment of the full costs of remediation). Conversely, 
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the Baggetts had no problem in obtaining conventional financing when they 
purchased their property. R. at 90-91, 235. In fact, the appraisal used by them at 
the time of their purchase did not value the Baggetts' land at zero dollars. R. at 
91. Additionally, there is no longer any lender liability for financing the purchase 
of contaminated property as in Schmidt, Sales in the Baggetts' Neighborhood 
923, located within the parameters of the Superfund Site, are reflective of trends 
within Salt Lake County. R. at 107. Fair market value sales are occurring within 
the subject's Neighborhood 923 and within the Superfund Site with no apparent 
adverse affect from contamination and are consistent with county-wide 
conditions.3 R. at 111, 248-249. Since the Schmidt decision, residential properties 
in the city of Herriman have been remediated at an estimated cost of $60,000 per 
acre, with no institutional controls placed upon the residential properties. R. at 
106-107, 146-147. With the success of the city of Herriman remediation, the 
Board used the clean up costs associated with Herriman as a stigma reduction 
available to taxpayers who have presented evidence of contamination and are 
located within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site. R. at 106-107. Schmidt 
was based upon the Tax Commission's findings that: the Schmidts' denial of 
financing was based upon uncertainty of the "environmental hazards" fl 1; no 
determination could be made whether the superfund would pay for the remediation 
*|8; and, the Board's appraisal did not take into account that a potential buyer 
2
 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(E) (1994). 
Sales of contaminated property have recently occurred within the Flagstaff-
Davenport Superfund Site and reflect no deduction for contamination. 
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would be "subject to payment of the full costs of remediation of the property" ^13. 
Baggett Brief Ex. "A." The above findings that led to the Schmidt decision are not 
present in the Baggetts' appeal for the relevant lien date of January 1, 2002. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12), "'Fair Market Value' means 
the amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." The Court in Schmidt stated that 
"[w]hat is required of the Commission is that it value the property based on its 
'fair market value.'" Schmidt at 692. With the uncertainty surrounding the 
contaminated property in Schmidt, the Schmidts may not have been hypothetical 
"willing buyers" having reasonable knowledge of the "relevant facts." 
The Baggetts' situation is different. The knowledge of the Flagstaff-
Davenport Superfund Site and all surrounding issues can be imputed to the 
knowledge that a hypothetical "willing buyer" would have regarding the "relevant 
facts" when the Baggetts purchased their property in 1996, but more importantly 
having that knowledge on the relevant lien date January 1, 2002. R. at 85, 90-91. 
Even though the Baggetts interpret the "fair market value" statute to mean what 
did they specifically know at the time of their specific purchase, such a 
characterization is erroneous and irrelevant. The definition of "fair market value" 
involves hypothetical willing buyers and sellers. In reviewing the definition of 
"fair market value," the Utah Supreme Court previously stated that it is irrelevant 
whether a "willing buyer" actually exists, instead, the "fair market value" 
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definition "contemplates nothing more than a hypothetical sale to a hypothetical 
willing buyer during the tax year. The sale is a statutory fiction indulged in by 
appraiser to arrive at fair market value." Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County v. 
Utah State Tax Comm 'n ex rel Benchmark Inc., 864 P.2d 882, 888 (Utah 1993). 
A hypothetical willing buyer would have known of the relevant facts surrounding 
the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site at the time of the Baggetts' purchase in 
1996 and most importantly on the lien date of January L 2002. The Baggetts 
cannot plead ignorance to the "relevant facts" when such facts were present and 
publicly known in 1996, as well as 2002. The standard is reasonable knowledge 
of the relevant facts as of the lien date to a hypothetical willing buyer and willing 
seller4, not a specific knowledge of all facts known by the Baggetts at the time of 
their purchase six years before the relevant lien date. These above distinctions 
between the Baggetts' appeal and the Schmidt decision are material and should 
lead to a different result than the one reached by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Schmidt. 
Schmidt indicates that there is no single method of appraising contaminated 
residential properties and that different facts may demand different results. The 
Court stated that it has never established a single, exclusive method for fixing the 
value of contaminated property and that it wasn't persuaded by cases in other 
jurisdictions that mandated a valuation methodology. Schmidt at 692. By refusing 
The Baggetts presented no appraisal evidence that a willing seller would sell its 
land for zero dollars. 
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to adopt a specific methodology and holding that valuation is a question of fact, 
the Court in Schmidt reaffirmed Questar Pipleline Co. and Utah Power & Light 
Co., which both advocate a case-by-case analysis. In Questar, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that factual differences between two cases could drastically alter the 
application of proper appraisal techniques. Questar Pipleline Co. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm % 850 P.2d 1175, 1178-79 (Utah 1993). In Utah Power, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that "[t]he fact the Commission has followed a certain 
procedure in the past does not commit it to do so eternally." Utah Power & Light 
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm '«, 590 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1979). The Baggetts 
urge the court to ignore this generally recognized legal determination and, in doing 
so, attempt to persuade the Court under the false premise that the Baggetts' facts 
and the Schmidt case are the "same, virtually identical, and substantially 
identical." Baggett Brief at 11, 13-15. These statements are a substantial 
mischaracterization of the facts of this appeal. 
The Baggetts are attempting to confine not only the Tax Commission but 
also the appellate courts to the same outcome of the Schmidt case "eternally." The 
Baggetts' argument does not take into account that different facts may dictate a 
different result.5 The Baggetts continue to argue that the Tax Commission is 
constitutionally required to use the Schmidt "methodology" and even if not 
5
 The only fact similar between these two cases is that both properties are located 
within the boundaries of the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site, contaminated 
with various levels of lead and arsenic. 
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constitutionally required to do so that "[b]ased solely on the principles of common 
sense and stare decisis, the Tax Commission is entitled to apply the same 
methodology for similarly situated taxpayers." Baggett Brief at 15. The Baggetts 
fail to adequately brief this argument, or provide any legal analysis supporting the 
doctrine (perhaps because it does not apply to this case). 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "[u]nder the doctrine of stare 
decisis, once a point of law is decided, that ruling should be followed by a court of 
the same or lower rank in subsequent cases confronting the same legal issue" State 
v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). The 
Baggetts' argument that the stare decisis doctrine applies fails because the issues 
and facts in this case differ from the pertinent legal issues and facts in Schmidt. 
Since a hypothetical willing buyer and seller would know that the EPA and UDEQ 
will bear the cost of cleaning up the contamination, the present contamination is 
not having an adverse effect on sales in the Baggetts' neighborhood. R. at 56, 
111,230,238. That was not the case in Schmidt. See Schmidt at 692-693. See 
also Baggett Brief Ex. "A" ffl|8 & 13. Because the "relevant facts" in this case are 
so different from the "relevant facts" in Schmidt, it is not appropriate to place a 
zero value on this property when the record shows that the market attributes value 
to these properties. R. at 90-91, 235-244. 
Furthermore, the Court in Schmidt made clear that it declined to reach a 
valuation methodology for contaminated property as a matter of law. Schmidt at 
692-694. The legal issues relating to the Schmidt decision that the Baggetts argue 
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are binding precedent were either not brought to the Court's attention or officially 
ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Schmidt. Schmidt is not binding 
precedent on this Court, because the issues raised in this appeal have not been 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court. Instead, as the United States Supreme Court 
has held "[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the 
attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so 
decided as to constitute precedents (citations omitted)." Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 
507, 510, 45 S.Ct. 148 (1925). Based upon the Baggetts mischaracterization of 
the issues on appeal, the application of the stare decisis doctrine to this case would 
be in error. 
II. THE BAGGETTS' CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
EQUALIZATION ARGUMENTS ARE 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS AND ISSUES 
BEING REVIEWED ON APPEAL 
As held many times by the Utah appellate courts, matters raised for the first 
time on appeal will not be considered. See Hamilton, et al. v. Salt Lake County 
Sewerage Imp. DisL, 393 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 1964).7 The Baggetts allude to an 
Additionally, the Baggetts took the time to reframe the issues appealed as they 
wished they had been appealed. Such a manipulation of the facts and issues 
regarding this appeal still does not make the Baggetts5 case like Schmidt. 
7
 See Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970), holding 
that "[o]rderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final settlement of 
controversies, requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory or 
theories of recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter 
change to some different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-
round of litigation." 
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equalization argument throughout their brief, but do not brief or fully develop the 
argument. Baggett Brief at 13. The Baggetts never attempted to present an 
equalization and uniformity argument at the Tax Commission and therefore 
nothing is contained in the record to support such an argument on appeal. The 
only evidence in the record presented at the Tax Commission dealing with 
uniformity and equalization was by the Board when its appraiser stated that the 
$60,000 stigma deduction has been provided to other taxpayers located in the 
Superfund Site if any evidence of contamination was present. R. at 108. Instead, 
the Baggetts indicate that the Tax Commission would violate its Constitutional 
mandate to ensure that property is assessed uniformly and equally if the Tax 
Commission didn't decide the Baggett case in strict compliance with the outcome 
reached in Schmidt. This argument fails for many reasons. First, the Tax 
Commission is not constitutionally mandated or obligated to ensure that property 
assessed in 2002 under a completely different fact scenario than was presented in 
the Schmidt case in 1995 is uniform and equal to the outcome reached in Schmidt. 
Second, the Baggetts just simply allude to a uniformity and equalization argument 
but have never developed this argument at the Tax Commission level or on appeal 
(possibly because of the difficulty with such a challenge to an assessment). 
See also, James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Ut Ct. App. 1987). "Further, the 
rule that a legal theory may not be raised for the first time on appeal is 'to be 
stringently applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual questions 
whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial (citations omitted)." 
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Even if the Baggetts had properly raised this issue, the Baggetts have not 
made a valid claim that their property is not assessed uniformly and equally with 
other properties. In Mountain Ranch Estates v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT 
86, 100 P.3d 1206 (Utah 2004), the taxpayer argued that because its property was 
not assessed consistent with the assessment of one other property (Glenwild), that 
the Tax Commission violated the constitutional uniformity and equalization 
requirements. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer 
must present evidence to establish that more than one property enjoyed the same 
valuation treatment that Glenwild received. The Court stated: 
Article XIII, section 2 of the Utah Constitution mandates the 
uniform and equal assessment of property. Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 
2, cl.l. Mountain Ranch's constitutional argument turns on the same 
theory that animated its claim to statutory relief: that irrespective of 
the accuracy of its fair market value assessment, the disparity 
between the valuation and Glenwild's entitles it to an adjusted 
valuation commensurate with Glenwild's. Without evidence to 
establish that another property enjoyed the valuation treatment 
afforded Glenwild, Mountain Ranch has no basis to support its 
position that constitutional equality and uniformity may be achieved 
by reducing Mountain Ranch's valuation. 
Mountain Ranch Estates at 1211. 
Like the taxpayer in Mountain Ranch Estates, the Baggetts have not 
presented any evidence that other property owners enjoy different valuation 
treatment. On the contrary, if the Tax Commission's decision is affirmed, the 
Baggetts will receive better treatment than others in their neighborhood, without 
an appraisal to support their value. As stated by the Tax Commission in Lazar v. 
Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, Appeal No. 02-0109 (2001): 
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By raising the equalization issue, Petitioner selects for himself a 
difficult standard of proof and perhaps an ineffective approach to 
resolving this valuation dispute. Equalization arguments generally 
arise in property tax appeals when the valuation of the property 
under appeal is markedly above the valuation of comparable 
properties. In effect, this provision is intended to bring the valuation 
of the property under appeal in line with the valuations of like 
properties, even if the adjustment reduces the valuation of the 
property to below market value. It is the Commission's position that 
an adjustment in a valuation on a theory of equalization is warranted 
only to correct an assessment which is an obvious outlier or where 
the evidence indicates a systematic or pervasive under assessment of 
similar properties. 
Lazar opinion f 3. 
The Baggetts did not introduce into evidence any comparables to indicate 
that they are being treated differently than similarly situated property owners 
located within the Superfund Site. But, if the Baggetts' land value is affirmed by 
this Court, the Baggetts will not be uniform or equal to any other similarly situated 
taxpayer within their Neighborhood 923, as well as those property owners located 
within the designated Superfund Site whether they evidence any contamination. 
R. at 141-142, 146-148,151-153, 245-247 and 389. Since, the other property 
owners are being assessed at fair market value, because the market has dictated the 
value of their property, the Baggetts would be receiving preferential unequal and 
non-uniform treatment. 
As indicated by the Board in its opening brief (but not addressed by the 
Baggetts' Response Brief), the duty of an appraiser is to interpret the market and 
the sales that are being consummated within the Superfund Site, not to go into the 
market and dictate what land values are worth. R. at 153, Board Brief at 43-44. 
13 
If fair market value sales are occurring without any adverse affect because of 
contamination or the properties location within the Superfund Site, then those 
sales are most indicative of fair market value for ad valorem tax purposes. The 
Board's methodology of interpreting the market sales occurring within the 
Superfund Site, and providing a downward adjustment of $60,000 per acre as a 
stigma deduction is consistent with the "willing buyer" "willing seller" standard, 
whereas the Baggetts' methodology in this case is not. R. at 236-244. 
In denying Mountain Ranch Estates' argument on uniformity and equality 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1006(4), the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he property 
owner cannot have both an absence of comparable properties and freedom from 
the constraints of the fair market value standard of valuation." Mountain Ranch 
Estates at 1211. This language is compelling when compared to the facts 
associated with the Baggetts' appeal. The Baggetts did not submit any sales of 
similar contaminated properties or an appraisal showing what the Baggetts' 
property would be worth (once adjusted for contamination). Even without this 
necessary evidence, the Baggetts attempt to free themselves "from the constraints 
of the fair market value standard of valuation" that shows property is selling 
within the designated superfund site for full fair market value irrespective of 
contamination. R. at 135-137, 151-153, 245-247. 
The Baggetts argue that the Board may apply a different methodology 
under a different set of facts and circumstances, and that is exactly what the Board 
did in valuing the Baggetts' land value at fair market value as dictated by the 
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actual market conditions of sales located within the parameters of the Superfund 
Site (and then applying the $60,000 per acre stigma reduction, arriving at fair 
market value with contamination). Baggett Brief at 15. The Board's appraisal is 
the best indicator of fair market value for the Baggetts' property and because any 
assessment of their land value at zero would make the Baggetts an arbitrary and 
obvious outlier of underassessment, the Court should correct the error of the Tax 
Commission's reduction of the Baggetts' land value to zero. The Tax 
Commission erred in providing the Baggetts with a land value of zero, thus 
making the Baggetts unequal and non-uniform to all other similarly situated 
taxpayers within the Flagstaff-Davenport Superfund Site. 
III. MR. BAGGETT'S COST ESTIMATES WERE 
NOT A RELIABLE INDICATOR OF "FAIR 
MARKET VALUE/9 
The Baggetts argue that uncertainty remains regarding the EPA and 
UDEQ's remediation plan and the payment of the costs associated with the 
Superfund Site remediation. The statement in the Baggetts' Response Brief that 
"until remediation is completed and the EPA and UDEQ have paid all costs and 
expenses, the Baggetts have nothing but promises" is inconsistent with their 
previous position. Baggett Brief at 11. The Baggetts' whole case at the Tax 
Commission and arguments contained in their response brief rests on the 
"promises" of the EPA and UDEQ in its generated cleanup costs for the whole 
Superfund Site. They argue that they only have "promises" when it comes to 
remediation, but yet the Baggetts used the EPA's and UDEQ's costs estimates of 
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the so called "promises" to present their entire case. If there is so much 
uncertainty with the EPA and UDEQ's remediation plan and costs, how could 
these costs be used to quantify any true measure of what would be allocated to the 
Baggetts' land? The Baggetts can't have it both ways. 
Furthermore, as the Board argued in its Opening Brief these costs should 
not have been deducted dollar for dollar from the land's assessed value (especially 
now that the Baggetts have called into question the "promises" of the EPA and 
UDEQ). Since the Baggetts did not submit an appraisal or independent opinion of 
value (perhaps because an appraiser would not have valued their land at zero) their 
claim that the EPA and UDEQ may never clean up their property, is suspect. 
First, property is already being cleaned up and second, why is the EPA and 
UDEQ's word as good as gold to the Baggetts when they are using the cost 
estimates to produce their own estimates, but yet the EPA's word is nothing when 
it states that the property is going to be cleaned up and at no cost to them? 
The Baggetts further argue that even if Mr. Baggett's costs estimates were 
off by 50%, it would still not change the economic determination of this case. The 
Baggetts even go as far as to indicate that "Mr. Baggett bolstered the credibility of 
his analysis by testifying that even if his analysis or the underlying Cost Estimates 
were off by 50%, the Cost Estimates allocable to his property would still exceed 
his land's assessed value." Baggett Brief at 17. The Board fails to see how a 
witness' credibility is "bolstered" by stating that even if you are off by 50% you 
have come up with a number in excess of any land value assessed by the 
16 
Assessor's office. By the same reasoning, the Assessor could send out its tax 
valuation notices and indicate a high level, when that level is called into issue, the 
Assessor could then "bolster" his credibility by indicating that even if the 
assessment is off by 50%, it is still lower than other comparable sales so that 
amount is justified for valuation purposes. If the Assessor were able to value 
property under the same parameters as the Baggetts were able to submit their cost 
estimates, there would be anarchy in the ad valorem property tax system. 
Regardless of the above determination of the "credibility" of the cost 
estimates, "what is required of the [Tax] Commission is that it value the property 
based on its 'fair market value.'" Schmidt at 692. By taking Mr. Baggett's suspect 
cost estimates that are based upon the "promises" of the EPA and UDEQ, the Tax 
Commission failed in its duty to value the property at "fair market value" when it 
simply deducted those costs dollar for dollar and valued the land at zero. The 
record before the Tax Commission was lacking in credible evidence to arrive at a 
"fair market value" of zero dollars for the land when the wealth of the evidence 
contained in the record supports a finding consistent with the Board's appraisal. 
The finding of the Tax Commission should be overturned. 
Contrary to the Baggetts' "uncertainty" arguments, a substantial amount of 
evidence regarding the properties located within the Superfund Site are present 
that were not present in the Schmidt case. Even so, with less known about the 
Superfund Site, the property owners in Schmidt presented an appraisal, coupled 
with remediation costs and their denial of financing from several lenders. See 
17 
Schmidt. The only evidence the Baggetts submitted in support of their requested 
value were the construction cost estimates of Mr. Baggett allocated out from the 
construction cost estimates to mobilize both the EPA and UDEQ for the 
remediation of the 20 properties located within the parameters of the Flagstaff-
Davenport Superfund Site. R. at 282-290. With such a limited amount of 
evidence to support the Tax Commission's finding of a land value at zero, the 
Baggetts failed to carry their burden of proof at the Tax Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board respectfully requests that the court 
reverse the Tax Commission's decision placing a zero value on the Baggetts' land 
for the 2002 tax year. Additionally, the Board prays that the court order the Tax 
Commission to enter a finding that the fair market value of the Baggetts' property 
for the 2002 tax year is $364,800 as evidenced by the Board appraisal submitted 
during the formal hearing on June 2, 2003. 
DATED this / day of February, 2005. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
THOMAS W. PETERS 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
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ADDENDUM 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
CCT I 5 2002 
DiSTttfCT ATTORNEY 
.C'VJL DIVISION 
Petitioner, 
Board of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, 
Respondent. 
Formal Hearing Decision and Order 
Appeal No. 02-0109 
Parcel. No. 1627160020 
Tax Type Property Tax 
Tax Year 2001 
Presiding: 
Irene Rees. Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: 
For Respondent: 
f H Lazar, property owner 
Jason Rose, Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney, and 
CindaLou Johnson, appraiser, Salt Lake Assessor's Office 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner brings this appeal from a decision of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization. This matter was argued in a Formal Hearing on September 5, 2002. 
ISSUE AND APPLICABLE LAW 
Petitioner raises an equalization issue, stating that his property is valued higher than like 
properties. Statutory provisions bearing on this issue are as follows: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-103 states in pertinent part: 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless 
otherwise provided by law. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1006 (4) directs the Commission to adjust property valuations "to 
reflect a value equalized with the assessed value of other comparable properties if: 
(a) the issue of equalization of property values is raised; and 
(b) the commission determines that the property that is the subject of the appeal 
deviates in value plus or minus 5% from the assessed value of comparable 
properties. 
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FACTS 
The facts in evidence that are pertinent to this decision are as follows: 
1. This appeal involves a property tax assessment for tax year 2001. 
2. The subject property is a single family residence located in a planned unit development 
(PUD) at 2106 East Connor Park Cove in Salt Lake County. The home is 
"contemporary" style with 2,150 sq. ft. of above grade living space and a partially 
finished basement. The lot is .09 acre. 
3. The subject property was initially assessed at $455,400 for tax year 2001. After hearing, 
the Board of Equalization adjusted the value to $415,000. 
4. There are two models of home in the PUD and eleven homes altogether. The homes 
were built over a period of years from 1992 to 1996. 
5. The subject property is one of five homes in the PUD that are the same model, size and 
floor plan. The "proposed values" for these properties for tax year 2001, according to the 
information available on the Assessor's web site, range from a low of $367,700 to a high 
of $457,600. The County's records indicate physical differences among the properties, 
but neither party put on evidence as to the particular features of these homes that may 
account for differences in assessed values. 
6. The home at 2123 E. Connor Park Cove is very similar to the subject property. The 2001 
"proposed value" for this property was $457,600. The property actually sold for 
$415,000 in March of 2000,1 indicating that the 2001 assessment for that property was 
too high. 
7. In preparation for the Formal Hearing, Respondent prepared an appraisal of the subject 
property that indicates a market value of $406,800. 
DISCUSSION 
The subject property sits within a PUD in Salt Lake County. The PUD is small, 
consisting of eleven homes, and, given that there are only two floor plans available, the 
development is rather homogenous. Nevertheless, there may be differences among the properties, 
such as basement finish, decks and patios that account for differences in market value. 
The sale of this property was used as the best comparable sale in Respondent's appraisal of the 
subject property. 
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Petitioner opened his presentation with a recitation of his history of tax disputes with the 
County concerning this property. Over the years, the subject property has been assessed at values 
higher than most or all of the other properties in the development. Petitioner has appealed the 
assessments nearly every year, and the Board of Equalization has reduced the value each time that 
he has appealed. For tax year 2001, the subject property was again assessed at the high end of the 
range of assessed values for this development. In fact, the subject property was assessed nearly 
$90,000 more than the similar model home at 2124 E. Connor Park Cove. 
Petitioner requests an adjustment to $400,000. However, he premises his request on an 
equalization argument pursuant to section 59-2-1006 (4) of the Utah Code rather than a market 
vaiue argument. We begin, then, by considering whether the facts of this case require an 
adjustment to equalize the value of this property with like properties in the same development. 
Section 59-2-1006 (4) of the Utah Code states that "the Commission shall adjust property 
valuations to reflect a value equalized with the assessed value of other comparable properties if: 
(a) the issue of equalization of property values raised; and (b) the commission determines that the 
property that is the subject of the appeal deviates in value plus or minus 5% from the assessed 
values of comparable properties. 
By raising the equalization issue, Petitioner selects for himself a difficult standard of 
proof and perhaps an ineffective approach to resolving this valuation dispute. Equalization 
arguments generally arise in property tax appeals when the valuation of the property under appeal 
is markedly above the valuation of comparable properties. In effect, this provision is intended to 
bring the valuation of the property under appeal in line with the valuations of like properties, even 
if the adjustment reduces the valuation of the property to below market value. It is the 
Commission's position that an adjustment in a valuation on a theory of equalization is warranted 
only to correct an assessment which is an obvious outlier or where the evidence indicates a 
systematic or pervasive under assessment of similar properties. 
In this case, the evidence indicates a wide range of values for the seemingly similar 
homes in this development. It is also clear that the subject property has been routinely and 
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erroneously assessed at the high end of the range,2 so that the Board of Equalization must adjust 
the assessment on appeal. Nevertheless, Petitioner has not shown a systematic and pervasive 
under assessment of like properties that would suggest some sort of discrimination in the 
valuation of his property, nor has he shown how setting the value of his property at $400,000 
would equalize his assessment with the other homes in the development, given that six of the 
homes would still have lower assessments than the subject property and four would remain 
substantially higher. Whatever errors there may be in the assessments of surrounding properties,3 
those errors do not justify plucking a value from thin air and applying it to the subject property. 
Even though Petitioner cannot prevail on his equalization argument, we are left with 
evidence that tends to show that the subject property was overvalued in the initial assessment. 
For instance, the same model of home in the same development sold in March 2000 for about 
$415,000, a price that is significantly below the original assessment on Petitioner's home. The 
Board of Equalization and the County Assessor's appraiser both agree that the sale of that home 
is the best indicator of value and that the original value was too high. In fact, the County's 
appraiser, after a closer evaluation of the subject and comparables in the area, estimated the 
market value of the subject property to be $406,800. This value is in line with Petitioner's 
estimated value of $400,000, and it falls within the range of the assessments of other properties in 
the PUD. 
Respondent has recommended an adjustment to $406,800, and supported that request 
with substantial evidence. That value is in line with most of the other assessments of properties 
in the development, the majority of which range from about $381,000 to $413,000, and 
overcomes any equalization argument. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
On the evidence and testimony presented, the Commission finds the fair market value of 
the subject property to be $406,800 as of January 1, 2001. 
2
 The wide range of values for similar properties in this PUD may indicate that errors in the 
information on the building cards on these properties need attention, or that the unique characteristics of 
these homes or lack of comparable sales impacts the effectiveness of the Assessor's mass appraisal system 
in these cases. 
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION: 
DATED this [_[ day of /V/fr/prV _, 2002. 
Administrative Law Judge 
The undersigned Commissioners have reviewed this matter and concur in this decision. 
OLvw 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commission Chair 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
Marc B. JohrteOn 
Commissi/Jrfer 
%&?d>z_ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for 
Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the 
date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 
et. seq. 
IR/02-0109.fof 
At the hearing, Respondent's appraiser testified that this neighborhood was scheduled for 
reappraisal to update the data in the County's records. 
